This article focuses on the politics of memory and forgetting after Auschwitz and apartheid. In the first two sections Habermas's critical contribution to the German Historikerstreit is discussed. Important in this regard is the moral dimension of our relation to the past. In the next two sections the emphasis shifts to South Africa and more specifically the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The article ends with a general discussion of the dilemma of historical "truth" and representation in contemporary societies.
could no longer afford to continue in the present. Once the moral claim of collective memory is discarded, the political content of collective memory can be reworked so that the potentially disruptive and alienating elements of the past can be 'put in perspective and rendered safe' (Pensky, 1989 (Liebenberg, 1996 : 140-141, 143-144) .
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was officially announced through The Promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. Members were appointed and the Commission worked between April 1996 and July 1998. It operated through three specialised committees -one dealing with the violations of human rights, one on amnesty, and another on reconciliation and reparation. In essence the work of the TRC involved the following:
allowing the stories of the victims of gross human rights violations to be told; considering applications for amnesty from perpetrators of such violations; and making recommendations on reparation to the victims, as well as devising measures for ensuring that human rights abuses are not committed again (Liebenberg 1996: 133, 150) . In this process the main objective of the TRC was to deal with the thorny issues of 'historical truth', on the one hand, and amnesty, reconciliation, and reparation, on the other. The aim was, thus, not to prosecute political leaders for crimes against humanity, but to secure a public recognition of the breaching of human rights in the past within the framework of an agreement on political amnesty. As in the case of Chile this implied a qualified concept of justice (Du Toit, 1994: 9) . It is thus understandable that not everyone was fully satisfied with the Commission and its workings." The critical question is: will the commsision, with all its shortcomings, be able to keep the memories of the victims alive as an integral part of South Africa's future public debate?
IV
In dealing with the politics of memory and forgetting after apartheid the TRC can be seen as a compromise in more ways than one. Firstly, the Commission was the result of a political compromise, being part and parcel of the negotiated settlement which marks South Africa's transition. The end of apartheid and white minority rule did not lead to the seizure of state power by the representatives of the majority. This political compromise at least avoided a full scale bloody revolution or civil war, and amounted to a process of national reconciliation. The TRC was intended to bring this process of political compromise to a conclusion, inter alia by granting amnesty to those 
